Philosophical considerations always already entangled in mathematics education research

David W. Stinson

Georgia State University, Atlanta, USA

Abstract: In this paper, I explore how mathematics education research is always already entangled with and in ontological, epistemological, and ethical considerations—that is, philosophical considerations—of the researcher (or research team) from beginning to end. The danger in too much of the existing mathematics education research, however, is limited acknowledgement of how philosophical considerations drive both knowledge production and knowledge dissemination in the field. Illustrating how the concepts ontology, epistemology, and ethics are made sense of across the research paradigm spectrum—predict, understand, emancipate, and deconstruct—sheds light on not only the possible divergences in approaches to research (mathematics education or otherwise) but also the interrelatedness of the concepts.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the past 30 years or so, several mathematics education researchers and scholars have explored just what the inclusion of a philosophical dimension might provide the discipline mathematics education (cf. Higginson, 1980). In the early 1980s, this inclusion was demonstrated through the formation of the Topic Study Group on Theory in Mathematics Education in 1984 at the 5th International Congress for Mathematical Education. Within the discussions of that group, philosophical considerations often took center stage. The purpose of the group, as Steiner (1985) summarized, was “to give mathematics education a higher degree of self-reflectedness and self-
assertiveness, to promote another way of thinking and of looking at the problems and their interrelations” (p. 16, emphasis in original). International collaborations found in edited volumes from the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s have continue to illustrate the importance of including philosophical dimensions. For instance, edited volumes such as the International Commission on Mathematical Instruction study *Mathematics Education as a Research Domain: A Search for Identity* (Sierpinska & Kilpatrick, 1998) and the three editions of the *International Handbook of Mathematics Education* (Bishop et al., 1996, 2003; Clements et al., 2013) contain several chapters exploring philosophical dimensions. Paul Ernest, through his many books and edited volumes (e.g., Ernest, 1991, 1994a, 1994b, 1998) and his founding and ongoing editorship of the *Philosophy of Mathematics Education Journal*, approaching its 30-year anniversary, is the most noted scholar who continues to bring philosophical dimensions to the fore in mathematics education.

Ernest (1991), in his foundational and often-cited book *The Philosophy of Mathematics Education*, surveys the philosophical dimensions of both mathematics and mathematics education. Drawing on Higginson’s (1980) argument that all human intellectual activity rests on assumptions of a philosophical type, Ernest questions some of the ontological, epistemological, and ethical problems and issues (among others) surrounding the philosophy of mathematics, the nature of learning, the aims of education, the nature of teaching, and the philosophy of mathematics education. Recently, Ernest (2016b) contended that applying philosophical methods to mathematics education matters because it gives people new ‘glasses’ through which to see the world. It enables people to see beyond official stories about the society, mathematics, and education. It provides thinking tools for questioning the status quo, for seeing ‘what’ is not what ‘has to be’; enabling us to imagine alternatives *[sic]* possibilities. (p. 2)

Here, I aim to assist others in imagining alternative possibilities by exploring the sense making of ontology, epistemology, and ethics within the historical moments of mathematics education research (Stinson & Bullock, 2012). I begin by connecting these philosophical considerations to paradigms of inquiry (i.e., theoretical and methodological considerations)—more familiar terrain for mathematics education researchers.
PARADIGMS OF INQUIRY AND MATHEMATICS EDUCATION RESEARCH

Details of various paradigms of inquiry available to mathematics education researchers through the overlapping and simultaneously operating historical moments of mathematics education research—the process–product moment (1970s–), the interpretivist–constructivist moment (1980s–), the social-turn moment (mid-1980s–), and the sociopolitical-turn moment (2000s–)—are provided elsewhere (see Stinson & Bullock [2012, 2015] for details of each moment and identified exemplars of mathematics education research studies within each moment). Without recounting the details, Table 1 (Stinson & Walshaw, 2017, p. 133) maps these ongoing historical moments (i.e., no end dates) to different paradigms of inquiry—predict, understand, emancipate, and deconstruct—which, in turn, support different theoretical frameworks and methodological approaches (see Stinson & Bullock, 2015, for details and cautioning of Table 1). Paradigms of inquiry highlight for researchers “what it is they are about, and what falls within and outside the limits of legitimate inquiry”; they are defined by responses to three fundamental and interrelated questions: the ontological question, the epistemological question, and the methodological question (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 108). The three questions are interrelated “because the answer given to any one question, taken in any order, constrains [more times than not] how the others may be answered” (p. 108).

Therefore, within each of the moments, within each of the paradigms, and within each of the theoretical frameworks and methodological approaches questions of ontology, epistemology, and, I add, ethics (among others) are always already entangled and are either knowingly or unknowingly engaged. Given that theoretical frameworks and methodological approaches are embedded in paradigms of inquiry, and paradigms of inquiry are embedded in assumptions of a philosophical type (cf. Crotty, 1998), no researcher (or research team) working in any moment, any paradigm, or any framework or approach, I believe, should be absolved from engaging questions of a philosophical type (cf. Ernest, 1991; Higginson, 1980).

Mirroring others (e.g., Crotty, 1998; Lather, 2006; Guba & Lincoln, 1994), I use the different paradigms of inquiry—predict, understand, emancipate, and deconstruct (see Table 1)—to structure the discussion. In that, how the concepts ontology, epistemology, and ethics are made sense of across the paradigm spectrum sheds light on not only the possible divergences in approaches to research (mathematics education or otherwise) but also the interrelatedness of the concepts.
Table 1: Mapping Moments of Mathematics Education Research to Paradigms of Inquiry

- Process–Product Moment (1970s--) → **Predict**
- Interpretivist–Constructivist Moment (1980s--) → **Understand**
- Social-Turn Moment (mid 1980s--) → **Understand** (albeit, contextualized understanding) or **Emancipate** (or oscillate between the two)
- Sociopolitical-Turn Moment (2000s--) → **Emancipate** or **Deconstruct** (or oscillate between the two)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paradigms of Inquiry</th>
<th>Predict</th>
<th>Understand</th>
<th>Emancipate</th>
<th>Deconstruct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*Positivist Experimental</td>
<td>*Interpretivist Social constructivist</td>
<td>*Critical</td>
<td>*Poststructural/ Postmodern</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quasi-experimental Classic &gt; Radical constructivist Critical Race Theory</td>
<td>Sociocultural &gt; Latino/a Critical Race Theory</td>
<td>Critical Theories of Race</td>
<td>Postcritical</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed methods &gt; Phenomenological Ethnographic Symbolic Interaction</td>
<td>Critical Ethnography</td>
<td>Postcolonial</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Posthumanist Post-Freudian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. * Indicates the term most commonly used; < or > indicates cross-paradigm movement. The BREAK in the original Lather and St. Pierre table indicated a shift from the Enlightenment humanist paradigms on the left to the post-Enlightenment, posthumanist paradigm on the right. Here it indicates a hybrid, in-between space where the researcher might adopt a critical postmodern theoretical tradition (see Stinson & Bullock, 2012, 2015).


**PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND MATHEMATICS EDUCATION RESEARCH**

But before I briefly discuss ontology, epistemology, and ethics, two caveats are necessary. First, although the concepts are presented as discrete, they are in fact continuous (i.e., interrelated); in that, to speak about one always includes speaking implicitly or explicitly about the other two (see Cannon, 2019, for a brief discussion of Karen Barad’s ethico-onto-epistem-ology in mathematics education research). Philosophical engagement in general is complex and multilayered; it requires
filigree ways of thinking with multiple and overlapping trajectories; ways of thinking that embrace uncertainty and openness rather than the fictions of certainty and closure. Second, the discussion is intended to be neither an argument between quantitative science versus qualitative science (see Ercikan & Roth, 2006) nor an argument between continental philosophy versus analytic philosophy (see Cooper, 1994). But rather, an informative discussion in which no matter where a person positions herself or himself (or themself) on the paradigm spectrum she or he (or they) sees the importance of knowingly engaging philosophical considerations throughout the research process.

**Ontology**

Ontology is one of those philosophical concepts that philosophers and theorists as well as researchers acknowledge but most attempt to quickly move over, under, or around in efforts to avoid meeting it head on. Its metaphysical part is its most avoided. Recall, in the context of social science research in general, the ontological question is the first of three interrelated questions to ask with respect to which paradigm(s) of inquiry the researcher might be positioned: “What is the form and nature of reality and therefore, what is there that can be known about it” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 108). Ontology in the context of mathematics education (research or otherwise) is further complicated by the “realness” (or not) of two specific entities: mathematical objects and human beings (Ernest, 2016a). The prevailing ontology of mathematical objects for over two millenniums, Platonism, asserts that mathematical objects exist independent of human beings’ thought, language, and practices. Ernest (1998), however, in careful detail discusses and critiques this ontological stance and others in his argument for a social constructivism as a philosophy of mathematics and, in turn, of mathematics education (research or otherwise) (see also Davis & Hersh, 1981/1998; Hersh, 1997; Tymoczko, 1998). The move toward a social constructivism as a philosophy of mathematics teaching, learning, and research engages ontological considerations of the nature of human beings. Here, it is not only a question of the nature of mathematical objects but also a question of the nature of “the ‘non-essential essence’ of learners, teachers and persons in general presupposed by teaching, learning and research in mathematics” (Ernest, 2016a, p. 7).

Ontological considerations are understood differently in each of the paradigms of inquiry: predict, understand, emancipate, and deconstruct. For instance, ontology in the predict paradigm (i.e., positivists) is objective realism, a view that objects—for example, mathematical objects—exist independent of the knower. Reality here is “objective” and “found” (Lather, 2006). This objective found reality is ordered by natural laws and mechanisms; the “‘way things are’ is conventionally summarized in the form of time- and context-free generalizations, some of which take the form of cause–effect laws” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 109). Direct experience not speculation is the
foundation of science, which advances “by a study of the ‘given’ (in Latin datum or, in the plural, data)” (Crotty, 1998, p. 20).

Ontology for the interpretivists and constructivists of the understand paradigm is subjective relativism. The real here is “apprehendable in the form of multiple, intangible mental constructions, socially and experientially based, local and specific in nature…and dependent for their form and content on the individual persons or groups holding the constructions (Guba & Lincoln, p. 110–111). Although there are important differences between the relativism of interpretivists and the relativism of constructivists, an essential similarity is that both uncritically accept the realness of their individual and collective interpretations and constructions (Crotty, 1998); critical here is understood in the critical theoretical sense (cf. Bronner, 2011). In short, reality is subjectively yet uncritically interpreted and constructed (Lather, 2006).

Historical realism is the ontology of the emancipate paradigm (i.e., critical theorists). What is real is shaped by current and historical social, cultural, political, economic, racial, ethnic, gender, and so forth discourses (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Discourses here are to be understood not only as language but also as the complex web of institutions, structures, signs, and practices that order and sustain socio-historical, -cultural, and -political constructed forms of social existence (Leistyna, Woodrum, & Sherblom, 1996). These discourses are reified and sustained with and in hegemonic structures that “are now (inappropriately) taken as ‘real,’ that is, natural and immutable” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 110). Hegemony constructs people as objects—those who are acted upon, rather than Subjects, those who act—who become so entrenched in their own oppressive condition that they do not realize their own subjugation or their complicity in the perpetuation of unjust social and economic systems (Freire, 1970/2000). Reality in brief is constituted with and in hegemonic systems of socio-historical, -cultural, and -political discourses of power (Lather, 2006).

Reality for the poststructuralists and postmodernists of the deconstruct paradigm is unknowable: that which exist is always already contingent, multiple, fragmented, and becoming. There is an incredulity toward universal metanarratives of being (cf. Lyotard, 1979/1984). The one universal mind of the rational human subject is replaced here with multiple minds, multiple subjects, and multiple knowledges that reflect different socio-historical, -cultural, and -political locations (Seidman, 1994). The ontology of the deconstruct paradigm therefore is an anti-universal realism that attempts “to pass beyond man [and woman] and humanism” (Derrida, 1978, 292). Such an ontology, however, is more than simply a critique of realism; in that, “it questions representation and the underlying belief of a reality that is independent of representation yet capturable by it” (Usher & Edwards, 1994, p. 14). In other words, “the real is not only what can be reproduced, but that which is already reproduced” (Baudrillard, 1983, p. 146).
Epistemology

Epistemology, unlike ontology, is often embraced by philosophers, theorists, and researchers as a productive site for research. The absence per se of a metaphysical component makes engaging epistemological considerations more consistent with the Enlightenment—the Age of Reason (cf. Foucault, 1978/2003). The growth of epistemological perspectives has been exponential; for every discipline of human pursuit there seems to be a proliferation of epistemologies.

Recall, the epistemological question is the second of three interrelated questions to ask with respect to researcher position across the paradigm spectrum: “What is the nature of the relationship between the knower or would-be knower and what can be known?” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 108). In the context of social science research in general, Crotty (1998) defines epistemology as “the theory of knowledge embedded in the theoretical perspective and thereby in the methodology” (p. 3). Such a definition makes explicitly engaging epistemological considerations throughout the research process inescapable. Where a researcher might be able to engage ontology implicitly (or not at all), such a strategy is not possible here. In the context of mathematics education, researchers and educators often hold different and at times conflicting epistemological stances. These conflicts often “lie along issues such as the subjective–objective character of knowledge, the role in cognition of the social and cultural context, and the relationship between language and knowledge” (Sierpinska & Lerman, 1996, p. 829). These conflicts stretch across the paradigm spectrum, given that epistemology too is understood differently in each paradigm of inquiry.

Objectivism, for instance, is the epistemology for the positivists of the predict paradigm. Here, the researcher and the researched “object” are independent entities, and the researcher is capable of researching the object without influencing it or being influenced by it (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Ideologies and biases of the researcher do not influence research findings as long as the prescriptive procedures of positivist science are rigorously followed (Guba & Lincoln). Objective knowledge is not only ideologically free but also universal; replicated findings are not only possible but also “true.”

The interpretivist and constructivist of the understand paradigm maintain a subjectivist epistemology. The researcher and the researched object here are forever linked through interactions; therefore, the findings are essentially produced in and through the research process (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). The world and objects do not exist independent of interpretations and constructions of the world and objects. In other words, consciousness—interpretivist and constructivist—“is always consciousness of something” (Crotty, 1998, p. 44, emphasis in original). Interpretivists understand knowledge as “culturally derived and historically situated interpretations of the social life-world” (p. 67). Constructivists, on the other hand, understand knowledge as
“contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interactions between human beings and their world, and developed and transmitted within an essentially social context” (p. 42). Different people and groups interpret and construct meanings differently; in that, both interpretations and constructions are socially and experientially based and local and specific in nature.

Similarly, critical theorists of the emancipate paradigm also acknowledge that different people and groups interpret and construct meanings differently. These interpretations and constructions, however, are embedded in a critical subjectivist epistemology that is forever intertwined with and in hegemonic discourses of socio-historical, -cultural, and -political power (cf. Kincheloe & McLaren, 1994; Kincheloe, McLaren, & Steinberg, 2011). Knowledge therefore is neither ideologically free nor universal but rather made in and through discourses of domination and oppression (Freire, 1970/2000).

The epistemological stance in the deconstruct paradigm is one in which the “nature” of knowledge found in humanism is replaced with the “discursive formation” of knowledge made in and through discursive events (Foucault, 1969/1972, p. 38). Knowledge as discursive formation is not concerned with uncovering the “truth” of the statements and discourses that comprise discursive events per se but rather with the “historical conditions, assumptions, and power relations that allow certain statements, and by extension, certain discourses to appear” (St. Pierre, 2000, p. 496). The field of discursive events, however, is a grouping that is always finite and limited at any moment to the linguistic sequences that have been formulated; these sequences may be innumerable, they may exceed the capacities of recording, memory, or reading; nevertheless, they form a finite grouping (Foucault, 1969/1972, p. 27). In effect, knowledge as discursive formation no longer maintains its privileged status as an objective reality, but rather knowledge itself becomes subjected to and limited by the very socio-historical, -cultural, and -political conditions, assumptions, and power relations against which natural knowledge within the humanist tradition claimed immunity (Stinson, 2016).

Ethics

Ethics is often regarded as the most accessible branch of philosophy given that “many of its presuppositions are self-evident or trivial truths: All human actions, for example, serve some end or purpose; whether they are right or wrong depends on an actor’s overall aims” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017, para. 4). Dewey and Tufts (1932/1985) describe ethics simply as “a systematic account of our judgments about conduct, in so far as these estimate it from the standpoint of right or wrong, good or bad” (p. 9). Similar to epistemology, there has been a proliferation of “codes of ethics” with nearly ever discipline of human pursuit developing its own.
A commonality of these multiple codes with respect to research is that they often provide guidelines on four overlapping areas of procedural concern: informed consent, deception, privacy and confidentiality, and accuracy (Christians, 2011; see also Sowder, 1998).

In the context of social science research in general, Guillemin and Gillam (2004) identify two dimensions of ethical concern: “procedural ethics and ‘ethics in practice’” (p. 262). They define procedural ethics as those ethical concerns most often addressed by research ethics committees (e.g., Institutional Review Boards). They define ethics in practice as the ongoing day-to-day ethical concerns that arise throughout the research process (e.g., the disclosure of sensitive information from a research participant). Although Guillemin and Gillam perceive continuity between the two dimensions, they frame ethics in practice within reflexivity. Reflexivity requires thinking about the researcher’s positionality and how the process of conducting research affects the study and the human relationships developed throughout the study (Glesne, 1999). In being reflexive, the researcher becomes alert not only to concerns related to knowledge creation (i.e., epistemology) but also to the ethical concerns of research (Guillemin & Gillam). Here, the researcher adopts “a continuous process of critical scrutiny and interpretation, not just in relation to the research methods and the data but also to the researcher, participants, and the research context” (p. 275).

Similarly, in the context of mathematics education research, Ernest (2012; see also Adler & Lerman, 2003) makes a four-point argument for ethics as the “first philosophy” of mathematics education research. First, ethics is at the center of the research process with respect to seeking informed consent, causing no harm or detriment, and ensuring confidentiality for all those involved (i.e., procedural ethics). Ernest claims that any research that does not conform to these most basic standards “is ethically flawed and its knowledge claims are suspect” (p. 13). Second, mathematics education researchers are participating “in the great, age-old human conversation that sustains and extends our common knowledge and cultural heritage,” as such “we and others benefit and grow” (p. 13.) Third, the species of human beings depends on its survival by sharing in ethical social and life behaviors with fellow humans. Fourth, drawing on Levinas and his ethics as first philosophy, Ernest states—

we owe a debt to the other that precedes and goes beyond reasons, decisions, and our thought processes, and precedes and exceeds any attempt to understand the other. Our infinite responsibility to the other person is, of course, ethical: “Ethics precedes ontology […] ethics primarily signifies obligation toward the other, that it leads to the Law and to gratuitous service, which is not a principle of technique” (Levinas, 1987, p. 183). (p. 13)
In the end, Ernest contends that positioning ethics as the first philosophy for mathematics education research enables the larger research community “to rethink and re-evaluate some of the taken-for-granted commonplaces of our practices” (p. 14). Such re-thinking and -evaluating opens up different possibilities for theorizing and researching mathematics teaching and learning.

How ethics is taken up across the paradigm spectrum is not so much about difference as it is about degree. Each of the paradigms—predict, understand, emancipate, and deconstruct—acknowledge at varying levels the importance of ethics throughout the research process. (Addressing and monitoring ethical concerns, however, have not always been practiced: e.g., the Tuskegee Syphilis Study.) The difference is the degree to which the researcher’s focus is on procedural ethics, ethics in practice, or somewhere in between (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004). Or, in the case of mathematics education research, points one and two (i.e., procedural ethics) or points three and four (i.e., ethics in practice) (Ernest, 2012).

The positivists of the predict paradigm rely heavily on the check boxes of the Institutional Review Boards; that which is ethical is knowable, discernable, and demonstrable. Objective ethical procedures drive the research process; these procedures exist independent of both the researcher and the researched. In the understand paradigm, ethics is a both–and concern for the interpretivists and constructivists. In that, both procedural ethics and ethics in practice are taken up (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004). Reflexivity here becomes key as questions about researcher and participant positionality and how the process of conducting research affects both the study and the human relationships are continuously engaged (Glesne, 1999). Reflexivity is key for the critical theorists of the emancipate paradigm as well. But here reflexivity is intertwined with and in critical socio-historical, -cultural, and -political interrogations of the so-named ethical procedures and practices (cf. Cannella & Lincoln, 2011). Conceptualizations of “good” research are expanded to include human well-being (Hostetler, 2005) and public interest (Ladson-Billings & Tate, 2006). Ethics in the deconstruct paradigm is interrogated further as even the possibility of ethics is considered. In other words, ethics, similar to existence, is always already contingent, multiple, fragmented, and becoming. Here, the governementality (i.e., the way in which the state exercises control of its populace) of ethics becomes a grave concern as the ideal of a universal moral code of ethics is catastrophic (Foucault, 1978/2003a, 1984/1996).

**Summary of Ontology, Epistemology, and Ethics**

Although dangerous, Table 2 provides a summary of the three philosophical considerations—ontology, epistemology, and ethics—across the paradigms of inquiry spectrum—predict, understand, emancipate, and deconstruct. It is dangerous because reducing a few thousand words down to a few dozen always erases the nuances of that which has been discussed. Nonetheless,
similar to Table 1 (see Stinson & Bullock, 2015, for details and cautioning of Table 1), Table 2 is provided here to offer a summative account of the discussion.

Table 2: Philosophical Considerations across the Spectrum of Paradigms of Inquiry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paradigm/Consideration</th>
<th>Predict</th>
<th>Understand</th>
<th>Emancipate</th>
<th>Deconstruct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ontology</strong> – study of existence</td>
<td>Objective Realism: existence independent of knower</td>
<td>Subjective Relativism: existence dependent on uncritical interpretations and constructions of knower</td>
<td>Historical Realism: existence through socio-historical, -cultural, and -political discourses of power</td>
<td>Anti-Universal Realism: existence always already contingent, multiple, fragmented, and becoming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Epistemology</strong> – study of knowledge</td>
<td>Objectivism: knowledge independent</td>
<td>Subjectivism: knowledge in and through interactions: interpreted and constructed</td>
<td>Critical Subjectivism: knowledge in and through discourses of domination and oppression</td>
<td>Discursive Formation: knowledge in and through discursive events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethics</strong> – principles of morality</td>
<td>Objective procedural ethics</td>
<td>Procedural ethics and reflexive ethics in practice</td>
<td>Critical integrations of procedural ethics and reflexive ethics in practice</td>
<td>Ethics always already contingent, multiple, fragmented, and becoming; anti-universal moral code of ethics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONCLUDING WORDS

It is important to acknowledge that ontology, epistemology, and ethics are not the only philosophical considerations that are explicitly or implicitly engaged during the research process. Higginson (1980) also pointed to considerations about beauty (i.e., aesthetics), purpose (i.e., teleology), and value (i.e., axiology). In more general terms, how a researcher understands the possibilities or impossibilities of issues such as “truth,” “certainty,” and “logical consistency” is dependent on how she or he (or they) positions herself or himself (or themself) across the paradigm spectrum. Such decisions are not only about theoretical frameworks and methodological approaches but also, and more germane, about worldviews: a particular standpoint or philosophy for living in and making sense of the world.

Lester and William (2005) claim that the relationship between knowledge claims and evidence regarding what is researched, how research is conducted, and how results are interpreted and represented is more than simply establishing logical consistency but rather is determined, in large
part, by a set of beliefs, values, and perspectives operating in the worldview of the researcher. Comparably, Lerman (2013) contends that the theoretical framework through which a researcher organizes her or his (or their) “research, reads the data, revisits theory and interprets the findings is critical, and without such work the values of the researcher are hidden but never absent, of course” (p. 629). Valero (2004) also points to researcher values:

What we choose to research and the ways in which we carry out that research are constructions determined, among other factors, by who we are and how we choose to engage in academic inquiry… There are considerable ‘subjective’ and ‘ideological’ grounds—rather than ‘objective’ reasons—to engage in particular ways of conceiving and conducting research in mathematics education. (p. 2)

Ultimately, considerations of ontology, epistemology, ethics, values, subjective and ideological grounds, and so on—that is, the researcher’s worldview—should precede not follow theoretical and methodological considerations. Explicitly and critically interrogating one’s worldview (i.e., one’s philosophical stances) should be the starting point of any research project, and maintained throughout. Without an explicit, critical, and continuous interrogation of one’s philosophical stances, researchers are often mired in simplistic conceptions and theoretical and methodological choices that perpetuate an “inquiry-as-technique mindset” (Paul & Marfo, 2001, p. 53) rather than inquiry-as-scholarly endeavor mindset (Boote & Beile, 2005). Throughout the process of conducting research on mathematics teaching and learning, such an interrogation might include asking a series of questions such as: Does mathematics, teaching, and/or learning exists outside of human interactions? How do we know that mathematics, teaching, and/or learning exists (or not)? What is mathematical knowing? What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for mathematics knowing, mathematics teaching, and/or mathematics learning? Beyond procedural ethics, what are the ethical obligations of mathematics education researchers? Are the ethical obligations of mathematics education researchers different from other disciplinary researchers? Responses to these (and other) generic, if you will, questions that should be asked throughout the research process take on different possibilities depending on the philosophical stances of the researcher. Not only are the possibilities of responses unique but also the very questions that might be asked are unique. In other words, philosophically stances of the researcher drive both the possibilities and the impossibilities of what questions might be or should be asked throughout the research process. Maintaining a critical interrogation of one’s philosophical stances throughout is difficult because it refutes certainty and closure. But through an explicit, critical, and continuous exploration of one’s philosophical stances, the frantic search that novice (and even seasoned)
researchers often experience in selecting theoretical frameworks and methodological approaches, I believe, more times than not becomes self-evident and trivial.

References


